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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by
virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (Supp. 1990).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was the Commission's finding that a duly authorized waiver
of the statute of limitations defense had been executed not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Petitioner identifies the following statute and rules as
those "whose interpretation is determinative" within the meaning
of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6):

Utah Admin. R. 861-1-7A(0); and

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(8) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Commission assessed taxes against Radix pursuant to an
audit.

Radix petitions for redetermination on grounds, inter

alia, that the three-year limitation period prescribed by Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-110(87) (1987) precluded assessment of taxes
prior to December 31, 1986.

The Commission ruled against Radix

on grounds that a duly authorized limitation waiver had been
executed.

Radix petitioned for reconsideration, and the

Commission reaffirmed its initial decision.

Radix petitioned

this Court for review and now limits its petition to the issue of
the authority of Diane Fanger to waive the legal defenses of the
corporation.

1

RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
1.

On or about April 14, 1989, Diane P. Fanger executed a

document entitled "Agreement, Waiver of Statutes of Limitation."
Exhibit 4, R. 152.
2.

Ms. Fanger was the accounting manager of Radix

Corporation.

Testimony of Timothy J. Draper, Transcript at

21:13-14.
3.

Ms. Fanger did not hold any corporate position as an

officer or director.
4.

Id. at 21:17-19.

Radix Corporation policy did not authorize any employee

who was not a corporate officer at the level of vice-president or
above to waive legal defenses of the corporation.

Id. at 21:13-

16; Affidavit of Alan C. Reed, dated January 28, 1991, R. 129131.
5.

The Commission auditor does not recall whether he even

questioned Ms. Fanger as to whether she had authority to sign the
document.
6.

Testimony of Gary M. Allred, Transcript at 36:12-15.

The Commission auditor merely assumed that Ms. Fanger

did not require authority from another person in the corporation.
Id. at 36:5-8.
7.

The normal procedure followed by auditors for the

Commission is not to have a corporate officer sign a waiver of a
limitations, but merely a person "generally in charge of
accounting."
8.

Id. at 40:10-18.

The only restriction in the Commission's normal

procedure as explained was that a file clerk or receptionist
2

would not be acceptable to sign such a waiver but a "person in
charge of accounting,"
9.

Id.

The only basis testified to by the Commission's auditor

to conclude that Ms. Fanger had authority, besides her signing
the document, was that she sometimes would tell the auditor she
had to check with Mr. Draper to receive additional information to
talk with him about something she thought it was necessary to
talk to him about.
10.

See id. at 36:19-25.

Mr. Draper's testimony and Mr. Reed's Affidavit stand

uncontradicted as to Ms. Fanger's lack of authority to waive
legal defenses of Radix Corporation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Commission failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
implied authority to support a finding that the limitations
waiver was authorized.

The uncontradicted testimony establishes

that Ms. Fanger had no actual authority, express or implied, to
execute the limitations waiver.
THE COMMISSION FAILED IN ITS BURDEN TO OVERCOME
PETITIONER'S LIMITATIONS DEFENSE AND, FURTHER,
UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY ESTABLISHED THAT NO
LIMITATIONS WAIVER WAS SIGNED BY A PROPERLY AUTHORIZED
PERSON.
The Commission's argument that it is not outside the
limitations period for much of its audit1 rests upon one apparent
1

The limitations period would bar assessments for the period
1/1/86 to 12/31/86 which were included in the audit, in light of
the Notice of Determination being issued on 12/12/90, by virtue of
the three year limitations period prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §
59-12-110(8)(1987).
3

premise:

that Diane Fanger had authority to waive a legal

defense on behalf of Radix Corporation.

Yet, Ms. Fanger neither

holds any corporate office nor was given specific authority to
waive legal defenses of the corporation.

The testimony of

Timothy J. Draper was uncontradicted on this point:

Mr. Draper

testified that "company policy specifically does not give [Ms.
Fanger] authority to sign [limitations waivers]."
21:13-16.

Transcript at

See also Transcript at 21:13-19 (Ms. Fanger holds no

corporate office).
Nor did the Commission offer testimony or corporate
documents from any source that would establish a grant of
authority to Ms. Fanger by the corporation empowering her to
waive its legal defenses.

Instead, Gary M. Allred of the

Commission admitted that he does not recall whether Ms. Fanger
was even asked whether she had authority to sign the waiver when
it was presented to her.

Transcript at 36:12-13. Mr. Allred

further testified that normal Commission procedure is to obtain a
waiver from "generally, a person in charge of accounting, .
not necessarily a [sic] officer[,]" albeit not a "file clerk or .
. . receptionist."

Transcript at 40:14-18.

The ramifications of this "normal" Commission procedure are
truly astounding.

Rather than approach the corporate treasurer,

who might be thought of as "the person in charge of accounting"

4

for a corporation,2 the Commission apparently seeks out whomever
is actually supplying information to it to sign a waiver of legal
defenses belonging to the company, regardless of their actual
corporate office or duties.

This procedure no doubt will come as

a shock to the officers, directors and shareholders of Utah
corporations where unauthorized employees have waived
corporations1 valuable legal defenses at the mere instance of
representatives of the Commission.

Indeed, the concept of

"waiver" as a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of a right is
totally at odds with the Commission's questionable choice of
corporate employees to execute a waiver under this "procedure."
In his closing arguments at the hearing, the Commission's
counsel focused on the issue of implied authority.3
no evidence upon which to find implied authority.

Yet there is
First, it is

important to keep in mind that "[i]mplied authority is actual

2

Even then, the Utah Supreme Court has previously recognized
that corporate treasurers (let alone non-officer bookkeepers) are
"commonly known . . . not ordinarily [to be] a principal officer
who binds a corporation." Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d
815, 818 (Utah 1979).
3

The Commission has never claimed (and has therefore waived
any claim of) any apparent authority on the part of Ms. Fanger.
This, no doubt, stems from the following rule:
"As [apparent
authority] rests on the doctrine of estoppel, it cannot be invoked
unless the person setting up the estoppel relied upon the conduct
of the corporate agents in his or her transactions with the
corporation." 2 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 449 at 416 (perm. ed. 1990).
Clearly, the
Commission cannot establish detrimental "reliance" by its own
desire for a waiver. It might still today seek a lawful waiver
from a duly authorized officer; the sole detriment to the
Commission is that now, as then, no duly authorized officer will
waive this defense.
5

authority circumstantially proved."

Fletcher, § 438 at 387.

Circumstantial evidence probative of actual authority is
absent in this instance.

Gary M. Allred essentially admitted he

did nothing more that assume Ms. Fanger had authority to execute
the waiver.

See Transcript at 36:5-8. The Commission's counsel

argued that Ms. Fanger "represented to the auditor that she had - she had the authority to sign such a document, and he relied on
that based on her actions . . . "

Transcript at 49:5-7. But this

argument is not accurate; the testimony of the auditor was that
he did not recall whether Ms. Fanger was even asked whether she
had authority.

Transcript at 36:12-13.

The only evidence offered to the Commission to prove
authority circumstantially was the following testimony of the
auditor:
Q.

Did you question at any given time
whether she had the authority to
sign this document [the limitations
waiver]?

A.

Well, I didn't - I can't remember, to be
honest with you. This was back in April of
'89.

Q.

And your statement on the previous
document, dealing with the sample method
projection — . . . — my question was,
was, at any given time, did she have to
request authorization to approve a
document to be signed [sic] or get
requests —

A.

Well, sometimes she wouldn't have
information or if she thought it was
something that Mr. Draper needed to get
involved with, she would make that
statement, that I — I need to talk to
Tim Draper.
6

Q.

And did she sign this document without
hesitation?

A.

Yes.

Transcript at 36:12-37:2. Thus, the only evidence offered
besides the auditor's bald assumption that Ms. Fanger had
authority was that, on occasion, Ms. Fanger would talk to Mr.
Draper when she felt she needed to talk to him.
This testimony does nothing more than state the obvious.
Ms. Fanger clearly thought she could sign the limitations waiver
or she would not have signed it.

The issue on implied authority,

however, is not what the agent "thinks" she is able to do, but
what actual authority can be shown by circumstantial evidence to
be vested in the agent.

The Commission, in the Brief of

Respondent, dated September 21, 1990, R 153-165, cited to Bowen
v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that
"[i]mplied authority embraces authority to do whatever acts are
incidental to, or are necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish
or perform, the main authority expressly delegated to the agent."
Here, the only evidence presented was that Ms. Fanger is a nonofficer who runs the accounting department.

No other evidence of

any grant of authority to Ms. Fanger was offered by the
Commission.
The question presented thus becomes:

is the authority to

waive a legal defense of a corporation "incidental to, . . .
necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform, the main
authority" of running an accounting department?

7

While the head

of an accounting department may well be the person from whom a
tax auditor seeks documents and information to be utilized in an
audit, it is pure guesswork to assume that such a person is
vested with authority to waive legal defenses of the corporation.
Indeed, there is nothing usual or ordinary about such a person
waiving legal defenses in the performance of their duties.4
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Draper established that
no policy allowed Ms. Fanger to waive legal defenses and that in
fact, the accounting manager does not have such authority.
Transcript at 21:10-19.

This uncontradicted testimony was

reaffirmed in the Affidavit of Alan C. Reed, dated January 28,
1991, R 129-130. Mr. Reed explained that never in the history of
Radix Corporation has any person other than an officer or
director, or for that matter, anyone with a title below that of
vice president, had any authority to execute waivers of legal
defenses.
If the Commission's procedure is, as was testified to by Mr.
Allred, not to seek out officers or directors of the corporation
to sign waivers, but simply to have any person dealing with them
on an audit above the level of receptionist or file clerk sign

4

An analogy would be that a bookkeeper who handles the
accounting in a law firm would be authorized to waive the legal
defenses of the law firm without the consent of the managing
partner or administrative shareholder. Just as lawyers in a law
firm would be surprised to find out their bookkeeper who had been
dealing with the auditors had waived a legal defense of the law
firm, so, too, would any corporate officer be surprised to find
their accounting manager had waived such legal defenses unless an
express policy allowing such waiver existed.
8

waivers, the Commission should be required to live with the
consequences of that procedure, or to change it. A contrary
result merely exalts the Commission's assumptions over the facts
shown by the evidence.

If anything, the law should encourage the

Commission to obtain waivers from persons having actual authority
to give them.
As a final point, the Commission has asserted that it is the
burden of Radix Corporation to establish its limitations defense.
Radix Corporation met its burden simply by pointing out the time
period that is outside statutorily allowed period.

The burden

then shifted to the Commission to establish that it had a duly
authorized waiver.
Defendants made a prima facie showing that the
limitation period had expired; plaintiff does not
contend otherwise. The burden was on plaintiff to show
there was an issue as to whether the limitation period
had not expired when he filed his complaint.
Irvine v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc., 102 N.M. 572, 698 P.2d 442,
443-44 (Ct. App. 1984) . See generally, 51 Am. Jur. 2d,
Limitation of Actions, § 484 (1970) ("Thus, when the plaintiff's
pleadings show upon their face that the claim sued upon is
actually barred by the statute, then a plea of the bar interposed
by the defendant will in effect shift the burden to the
plaintiff, who will be obliged to produce evidence to relieve his
claim from the bar of the statute.").
CONCLUSION
Because the Commission is unable to establish actual or
implied authority of Ms. Fanger to execute such a waiver, it is
9

unable to avoid the limitations defense asserted by Radix.
The decision of the Commission should be reversed as to the
conclusion Ms. Fanger was authorized to execute a limitations
defense and the matter should be remanded to the Commission with
directions to exclude from its determination of tax owing any
sums barred by the limitations period.
DATED this 4

day of September, 1991.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & tf^BEKER
D^id W. Scofield
John B. Lindsay

4*4

Attorneys for Pejbitione

26526-1
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
RADIX CORPORATION,
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL DECISION

Petitioner,
v.

Appeal No. 90-0991

AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Account No. C35134
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on October 3, 1990.

Paul F. Iwasaki,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.

Present

Timothy Draper.

and

representing

the

Present and representing

Petitioner

was

the Respondent was

Rick Carlton, Assistant Attorney General.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is sales tax.

2.

The period in question is January

1986 through

December 1988.
3.

The

Petitioner

above-mentioned period of time.
sales and use tax deficiency
arose in several areas:
state sources; (2)

(1)

was

audited

for

the

As a result of that audit, a
was

assessed.

The

deficiency

Purchases of produces from out of

Payments made for the purchase of brochures

from publishers outside of Utah which were then sent to the
Petitioner's customers; (3)
Corporation

by the

Payments made to Customer Service

Petitioner

for

use of

an

automobile owned by Customer Service; and (4)

airplane

and

A transaction

with a company known as "Nipsco," wherein Nipsco provided the
Petitioner with software and the Petitioner in turn reduced the
price of a computer system sold to Nipsco by a certain amount.
Sales tax on the sale to Nipsco of the computer system was
calculated on the difference between the price of the computer
system less the amount credited for the software given in trade
by Nipsco.
4.

Because

of

a

lack

of

Petitioner, the auditor was unable
documents.
method.

cooperation

to obtain

all

by

the

necessary

Therefore, an assessment was based upon a sampling

Use of that sampling method was agreed

to

by the

Petitioner's accounting manager.
5.

At the time the audit was conducted, part of the

audit period was outside of the statute of limitations for the
assessment of any additional tax.
the

Petitioner

agreed

by

signed

The accounting manager for
waiver

form, to waive the

statute of limitations as a defense against any assessment made
for the period in question.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount
paid or charged for leases and rentals of tangible personal
properties if the property site is in this state, if the lessee
took possession in this state, or if the property is stored,
-2-

used, or otherwise consumed in this state.

(Utah Code Ann.

§59-12-103(k).)
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount
paid or charged for tangible personal property stored, used, or
consumed in this state.

(Utah Code Ann. §59-12-103(1).)

The petitioning party shall have the burden of proof
to establish that its petition shall be granted.

(Utah State

Tax Commission Administrative Rule R861-l-7A(g).)
DECISION AND ORDER
The threshold issue in this case is whether or not the
Respondent

is

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations

from

assessing a sales tax deficiency for the period of time three
years prior to the assessment of the deficiency.
It is the Petitioner's contention that the statute of
limitations bars such action in the present case because the
Petitioner
authority

claims
to

limitations.

the

agree
The

accounting

to

the

Petitioner's

manager

waiver

of

witness

had

no

actual

the

statute

of

stated

that

the

company's policy prohibited the accounting manager from signing
such a document.
It should be noted that the Petitioner presented no
further

evidence

regarding

the

authority

of the

accounting

manager either by way of a copy of the company policy, the
company's

bylaws,

or the testimony

of

any other

corporate

officer.
It was the testimony of the auditor that he dealt with
the accounting manager during the audit and on no occasion did
she ever give any indication that she was not authorized to act

in the manner

in which she did.

The auditor testified that

during the audit period he requested numerous items from the
accounting manager and that those items were provided to him.
Further, if there were occasions where

items were requested

which the accounting manager was not authorized to provide, she
so informed him of that fact.

Here, there was no indication by

the accounting manager that she was not authorized to sign the
statute of limitation waiver consent form without first having
sought permission from any other individual.
Based
that

the

upon

the foregoing, the Tax

Petitioner's

mere

assertions

Commission

that

the

finds

accounting

manager did not have the authority to sign the

statute of

limitation waiver agreement, when viewed in light of all the
evidence

presented,

does

not

support

a

finding

that

the

accounting manager acted outside the scope of her authority.
Therefore, the Tax Commission finds that the Respondent is not
barred from assessing

a deficiency

for the audit period

in

.question by the statute of limitations.
The Commission next turns to the issue of the taxable
status

of

each

of

the

items

brought

into

issue

by

the

Petitioner.
With respect to the freight and brochure issues, the
Petitioner presented no evidence other than its testimony that
there were
taxed.

items

in the

Specifically,

audit

which

the Petitioner

should
failed

not
to

have

been

present

any

documents or invoices that would support: its broad claim that
some of the freight charges were non-taxable.
Petitioner failed to meet its burden of proof.

Therefore, the

The

same

is

true

with

the brochures

in question.

Specifically, the Petitioner claimed that those brochures were
purchased from out of state vendors and mailed from those sites
to

customers

located

outside

of

Utah.

Therefore,

Petitioner claimed that those items never entered Utah.

the
Here

again, as with the freight issue, the Petitioner offered no
evidence other

than the testimony of

actions occurred.

its witness that such

No mailing lists or invoices or any such

documents were offered to corroborate the Petitioner's claims.
With respect to the transaction with Nipsco, wherein
the Petitioner received software from Nipsco and then credited
Nipsco's

account

in

a corresponding

amount,

the Petitioner

claimed that the transaction was not taxable because it did not
receive anything of value.
The Commission finds that in the present case, the
software the Petitioner accepted as a "trade-in" was tangible
personal property and not intangible property as claimed by the
Respondent.
Although

the

software may have

been

customized

or

created for Nipsco or some entity other than the Petitioner, it
lost that status when it was traded or exchanged to subsequent
parties.

At that time, the software became tangible personal

property.

Therefore, sales tax applies only to the difference

in price between the credit given for the software and the
price of the computer system.
With regard to the payments made by the Petitioner on
behalf

of

Customer

Service

for

use

of

the

airplane

and

automobile, the Petitioner maintained that such payments did
not constitute a lease or a rental agreement and, therefore,
should not be subject to tax.

Petitioner further argued that

because Customer Service had already paid sales tax on the
purchase of the airplane and automobile, and because Customer
Service is a related company of Radix Corporation, additional
tax should not be imposed.
Although Customer Service may have paid sales tax at
the time of the purchase of the airplane and automobile, such
action does not prevent the imposition of subsequent taxes due
for the rental or lease of those items.

In the present case,

Customer Service is a legal entity separate and apart from the
Petitioner, and should be treated as such.

Here, the payments

on the loan by the Petitioner on behalf of Customer Service in
return

for

use

of

the

airplane

and

automobile

constituted

rentals of those items between two separate legal entities and
were thus subject to sales tax.
Based

upon

the foregoing, the Tax Commission

that with respect to all the items

finds

in the audit, with the

exception of the software accepted as a trade-in with Nipsco,
the Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proof to show
that adjustments to the audit are necessary or that the audit
deficiency as assessed to those items is incorrect.

To that

extent, the Tax Commission affirms the determination of the
Auditing Division.

With respect to the sales transaction with

Nipsco, the Tax Commission

finds that the Auditing Division

erred in assessing a sales tax deficiency on that transaction.
-6-

The Auditing Division is ordered to amend its audit report in a
manner consistent with this opinion.
DATED this

BY

*R

It is so ordered.

day of ^nyvmOUA^

, 1991.

ER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

~R. H. Hansen
Chairman

B. Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petilion for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1),
63-46b-14(2)(a) .
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
/

Radix Corporation
c/o Timothy J. Draper
102 West 500 South, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing D^ r
Heber M. Wells Bldg,
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Sam Vong
Operations, Central Files
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
DATED this

S

day of ^^puYV^OLKJl}^
;0/Y*JEO o
Secretary
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^,,

, 1991

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
RADIX CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
ORDER
v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

Appeal No. 90-0991

Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter camp before the Utah State Tax Commission
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dated January 29, 1991,
filed by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final
decision, dated January 10, 1991.
FINDINGS
1.

Utah

Administrative

Rule

R861-1-5A(P)

provides

that a Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for
reconsideration
discovery

of

either
new

a

mistake

evidence."

in

Under

law
this

or

fact,
rule,

or

the

the

Tax

Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying a
Petition for Reconsideration.

representative was a certified public accountant who did not
demonstrate any inability to adequately prepare and present the
Petitioner's case.
5.

The prehearing conference on this matter was held

on July 9, 1990, some four months prior to the date of the
formal

hearing.

During

that

time,

the

Petitioner's

representative had ample time to prepare its case, and after
having done so, if he

felt

unsure

or

otherwise

unable to

proceed, had ample opportunity to obtain legal counsel.

That

the Petitioner's representative consciously decided not to do
so is a risk to be borne by the Petitioner.
6.

The Petitioner's

counsel

also alleges that the

Tax Commission erred in its determination that the statute of
limitations did not apply.
7.

After

having

considered

the

argument

of

the

Petitioner, the Commission finds that the facts presented at
the hearing establish a sufficient basis for its finding that,
as a matter of law, the Petitioner's accounting manager did not
act outside the scope of her authority and that the statute of
limitations was not applicable in the present case.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission

finds

that the assertions made by the Petitioner in its Petition for
Reconsideration are either unsubstantiated or so insignificant
that the granting of the Petition would not be proper.

The

Petitioner's

the

Petition

for

Reconsideration

-3-

or,

in

Alternative, Conversion to Informal Adjudicative Proceeding, is
denied.

It is so ordered.
DATED this

£l

day of

P<LXMAXOU^AK,

1991.

BY JDRDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.
^APSCNT
R. H. Hansen
Chairman

Roger 0. Tew
Commissi

Jqfe^ST. Pacheco
Commissioner

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of the final
order to file with the Supreme Court a petition for judicial
review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(1), 63-46b-14(2)(a).
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I-mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Radix Corporation
c/o John B. Lindsay
CALLISTER DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple #800
Salt Lake City, UT
84133
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Rick Carlton
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
DATED t h i s

2\
X\

day of

F "gXnUQLAA-K_
wiUj
V
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, 1991

